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Abstract: Lane changes are complex safety- and throughput-critical driver actions. Most lane-
changing models deal with lane-changing maneuvers solely from the merging driver’s standpoint 
and thus ignore driver interaction. To overcome this shortcoming, we develop a game-theoretical 
decision-making model and validate the model using empirical merging maneuver data at a 
freeway on-ramp [1-2]. Specifically, this paper advances our repeated game model in [2] by using 
updated payoff functions. Validation results using the Next Generation SIMulation (NGSIM) 
empirical data show that the developed game-theoretical model provides better prediction accuracy 
compared to previous work, with correct predictions approximately 86% of the time. In addition, a 
sensitivity analysis demonstrates the rationality and sensitivity of the model to variations in various 
factors. To provide evidence of the benefits of the repeated game approach, which takes into account 
previous decision-making results, a case study is conducted using an agent-based simulation model. 
The proposed repeated game model produces superior performance to a one-shot game model, 
when simulating actual freeway merging behaviors. Finally, this lane change model, which captures 
the collective decision-making between human drivers, can be used to develop automated vehicle 
driving strategies. 
Keywords: Lane-changing; Merging maneuvers; Game theory; Decision-making; Intelligent 
vehicles 
 
1. Introduction 
Driving behavior strongly affects the safety and throughput of the transportation system [3]. 
Due to its interference with surrounding vehicles, lane-changing significantly affects traffic stream 
flow. Several studies have concluded that lane-changing produce a capacity drop forming a 
bottleneck [4-6]. The impacts of lane-changing maneuvers have been modeled in several studies [7-
10]. In particular, Liu et al. [11] argued that traffic conflicts between merging and through vehicles, 
which are common near freeway on-ramps, are notable for inducing shockwaves, resulting in 
congestion. In order to analyze traffic flow, therefore, development of a state-of-the-art lane-changing 
model is important. 
The applications of lane-changing models can be broadly classified into two groups: adaptive 
cruise control and microscopic traffic simulation [3]. Driving assistance models for adaptive cruise 
control consist of collision prevention models and automation models [12]. In addition, driving 
decision models focus on drivers’ lane changing decisions for different traffic conditions and for 
different situational and environmental characteristics [12]. Lane-changing models were proposed 
based on various methodologies, which are reviewed in the next section, and calibrated based on 
field data collected on freeways. These models are an important component of microscopic traffic 
simulation [13]. Most models, however, focus on only the lane-changing vehicle in decision-making 
and vehicle control, which could be detrimental in microscopic traffic simulation, as interaction with 
surrounding vehicles is also critical in lane-changing. Specifically, drivers of vehicles surrounding 
the lane-changing vehicle, especially the closest following vehicle in the target lane, react after 
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recognizing a lane-changing vehicle’s intention to change lanes. For example, a human driver will 
sometimes not allow a lane change. Even though this type of competitive lane-changing behavior is 
rarely observed, decision-making considering drivers' interaction when changing lanes should be 
studied in order to develop a precise lane-changing model. 
In addition, modeling a driving strategy for automated vehicles (AVs) gives rise to a new 
application for lane-changing models. The introduction of AVs onto the roadway means that 
reasonable lane-changing decision-making can be conducted by an intelligent robot or well-
programmed machine. During the transition to fully autonomous transportation systems, 
harmonization with human drivers will be necessary for the operation of AVs. Therefore, 
development of a realistic lane-changing model that can depict human drivers’ decision-making is 
also required to enhance AVs’ driving performance. 
This paper enhances our repeated game lane-changing model proposed in [2] and evaluates the 
proposed model’s performance. The paper begins by introducing the lane-changing models based on 
various methodologies, including a game theoretical approach. To enhance model efficiency and 
complement the multivariate function in the previous model, the payoff functions for a stage game 
are reformulated in Section 3. This study also applies the repeated game approach, which uses 
cumulative payoffs, in order to capture realistic human driver behavior at a freeway merging section. 
Both the repeated game model and the one-shot game model based on the reformed stage game are 
calibrated and validated using empirical data extracted from the NGSIM dataset [14-15] to 
demonstrate the prediction ability. In the rest of this paper, we present a sensitivity analysis to 
describe the stage game’s efficiency. The simulation case study using an agent-based model (ABM) 
follows. Finally, we draw concluding remarks on this work, and point out areas of potential future 
research. 
2. Literature Review 
A comprehensive literature review is required to introduce previous research efforts and present 
the motivations for this study. This section begins with a review of lane-changing models, focusing 
on methodologies. Then, game theory-based models are introduced in detail. Based upon the 
literature review, the motivations for the study are presented.  
2.1. Lane-Changing Decision-Making Models 
In general, the lane-changing process can be categorized as a sequence of four steps: (1) checking 
for lane change necessity, (2) lane selection to decide on a target lane, (3) gap choice in the target lane, 
and (4) lane-changing execution through gap acceptance. To model lane-changing behaviors, lane-
changing models have been developed using various methodologies that can be grouped into four 
types: (1) rule-based models, (2) discrete-choice-based models, (3) artificial intelligence models, and 
(4) incentive-based models [3].  
The first model type, the rule-based model, is one of the most popular driver-perspective based 
methodologies [3]. Drivers’ decisions in the lane-changing process are simply defined as the 
independent variable. Gipps [16] initially introduced a lane-changing model covering various urban 
driving situations, which was intended for microscopic traffic simulation tools [17]. Gipps’ model 
represented the lane-changing process as a decision tree with a series of fixed conditions, where the 
final output of this rule-based triggered event is a binary choice (i.e., change or not change) [3]. The 
CORSIM model classified lane changes into two types: (1) discretionary lane-changing (DLC), which 
occurs when a driver is unsatisfied with the driving situation in their current lane, while the target 
lane shows better driving conditions; (2) mandatory lane-changing (MLC), which is coercively 
required according to the route choice (i.e., lane change toward on-ramp or off-ramp) [18-19]. 
Rahman et al. [3] categorized the game theory-based model, which explains lane-changing when a 
traffic conflict arises between the merging vehicle and the closest following vehicle in the target lane, 
as a rule-based model. Game theory, which is used in this paper, is the study of mathematical models 
of conflict and cooperation between decision-makers [20]. It focuses on decision-making in 
consideration of the interaction between intelligent drivers. Using a game theoretical approach is 
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advantageous in that it takes into account the behaviors of a following vehicle driver in the target 
lane, while the other approaches introduced above focus only on the lane-changing vehicle driver’s 
decision.  
The second model type, the discrete-choice model, relies on a logit or probit model to describe 
lane-changing maneuvers. Lane-changing is decided based on probabilistic results instead of binary 
answers. Ahmed [21] modeled lane-changing motivation (i.e., trigger to change a lane), target lane 
choice, and gap acceptance, presenting three categories of lane-changing: DLC, MLC, and forced 
merging (FM), in which a gap is not sufficient but a driver nonetheless executes a lane-changing 
maneuver in heavily congested traffic conditions. Ahmed [21] assumed that critical gaps follow a 
lognormal distribution to guarantee that they are nonnegative. Toledo et al. [22] developed a 
probabilistic lane-changing decision model by combining MLC and DLC through a single utility 
function. Both models developed by Ahmed [21] and Toledo et al. [22] considered drivers’ 
heterogeneity, such as aggressiveness and driving skill level, using a random term as one of the 
explanatory variables.  
The third model type, which includes fuzzy models and artificial neural network (ANN) models, 
are artificial intelligence models. The fuzzy model considers humans’ imprecise perception and 
decision biases, and incorporates more variables than the common mathematical models [23]. 
However, the fuzzy model has disadvantages, such as unexpected difficulties and complexity in the 
fuzzy rules [23]. The ANN model processes information using functional architecture and 
mathematical models that are similar to the neuron structure of the human brain [3]. Hunt and Lyons 
[24] modeled the lane-changing decisions of drivers on dual carriageways. Since the neural network 
model is completely data-driven and requires field-collected traffic data, Hunt and Lyons used 
interactive driving simulation to train the model. As this example shows, one major disadvantage of 
the ANN model is that it requires a huge amount of data to be optimized and also requires a training 
period. 
The last type of model, the incentive-based model, models lane-changing desire utilizing the 
defined incentive. In other words, this model assumes that a driver chooses to change lanes in order 
to maximize their benefits [3]. The minimizing overall braking induced by lane change (MOBIL) 
model, which was developed in Kesting et al. [13], is based on measuring both the attractiveness and 
the risk associated with lane changes in terms of accelerations. Therefore, both the incentive criterion 
and the safety constraint are formed using the acceleration function of the underlying car-following 
model. In addition, the model attempts to capture the degree of passive cooperation among drivers, 
using the politeness factor as a weight on the term for total advantage of the surrounding vehicles. 
2.2. Game Theory-based Lane-Changing Decision-Making Model 
It is clear that lane-changing involves not only a driver of the subject vehicle (SV), who is 
motivated to change lanes, but also a driver of the lag vehicle (LV) in the target lane, who controls 
their own vehicle (i.e. the LV) after perceiving the lane-changing vehicle in the adjacent lane. 
Specifically, the driver of SV controls their longitudinal and lateral movements to safely change a 
lane in consideration of surrounding vehicles, and the driver of the LV responds by showing 
acceptance or non-acceptance of an SV’s lane-changing intention. This decision-making process 
involving both drivers motivated previous studies to use a game theoretical approach. Game theory-
based models, therefore, were modeled as a two-player non-cooperative game.  
Kita [25] modeled merging-giveway interaction between vehicles in a merging section based on 
a game theoretical approach. The action strategies of the driver of SV are merging or maintaining the 
current lane, while the strategies of the driver of LV in the target lane are giving way (i.e., yielding) 
or not. Kita [25] modeled interaction between drivers as a game under perfect information conditions. 
However, perfect information in game theory indicates that all players have perfect and 
instantaneous knowledge of their own utility and the events that have previously occurred. In a 
traditional transportation environment, in which a driver becomes aware of surroundings through 
sight only, this assumption is irrational. Additionally, Kita’s model assumed that vehicle speeds were 
constant during the merging process, which is likewise unrealistic [11]. 
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Liu et al. [11] modeled merging and yielding behavior using modeled payoff functions about 
the drivers’ objectives. In Liu et al. [11], the objective of the driver of SV is to minimize the time spent 
in an acceleration lane subject to safety constraints, while the objective of the driver of LV is to 
minimize speed variation. The payoffs of drivers of the SV and LV were formulated using 
acceleration level and time that the merging vehicle spends in the acceleration lane for each action 
strategy, respectively. However, the driver of SV occasionally showed different behaviors, which 
were assumed to be based on the objective of the driver of SV. Kondyli and Elefteriadou [26] found 
that all drivers want to reach a speed close to the freeway speed or the speed limit, if there is no lead 
vehicle. This speed synchronization process that causes drivers to accelerate when arriving at the 
beginning of an acceleration lane was observed at a merging section on a freeway [27]. To solve the 
game, Liu et al. [11] proposed a bi-level calibration framework, in which the upper level 
programming is an ordinary least square problem and the lower level programming is a linear 
complementarity problem for finding the Nash equilibrium. 
In [1], we modeled a decision-making game model for merging maneuvers using five decision 
factors and evaluated the proposed model using NGSIM data. In addition, we introduced a repeated 
game approach in order to avoid instantaneous fluctuation of decisions in microscopic simulation 
[2]. Even though these models showed high prediction accuracy, there were limitations, namely: the 
number of data showing all action strategies sets was unbalanced due to data collection during the 
morning peak time, and the model validation results were unable to show the distinct performance 
of the repeated game approach in microscopic simulation.  
The development of advanced vehicle technologies (e.g., vehicle-to-vehicle communication) and 
AVs, has led recent research efforts to focus on the cooperative interaction between vehicles [28-29]. 
Talebpour et al. [29], for instance, modeled both mandatory and discretionary lane-changing by 
applying the Harsanyi transformation [30] within a connected environment. And Yu et al. [31] 
designed a human-like, game theory-based controller for AVs in consideration of mixed traffic. 
2.3. Motivation and Contribution of the Paper 
The following are the contributions of the paper. First, we enhance the payoff functions that 
were previously developed in [1-2] by taking into consideration multiple decision factors and 
normalizing the decision variables. Multivariate functions using variables, which have different 
units, may induce a trivial equilibrium solution when variables are correlated. To solve this issue, we 
reformulated the payoff function by considering dimensionless variables. Second, we validate and 
compare the previous and proposed models. Third, we conduct a sensitivity analysis of the proposed 
model performance. Fourth, we demonstrate the benefits of a repeated-game approach using a 
simulation tool. The repeated game model first introduced in [2], in which a stage game is repeatedly 
played taking into consideration previous game results, showed no evidence of benefits compared to 
a one-shot game model played independently based on instantaneous data at every decision point. 
If there is competition between drivers due to an ambiguous merging situation—for example, not 
only small lag spacings but also similar vehicle speeds—, the one-shot game model may be sensitive 
to instantaneous data, causing fluctuations in driver decisions during the decision-making process. 
On the other hand, the repeated game model’s initial cooperative decision can be expected to remain 
the same when there is only a slight variation in payoffs. Furthermore, the game model can produce 
a change from a non-cooperative to a cooperative game. Even though this type of driver competition 
in merging seldom occurs, the robust game model can be integrated into a microscopic traffic 
simulation software in order to simulate stereotypical vehicle movement patterns. Consequently, in 
this study we adopt the previous repeated game approach with enhancements in the payoff function 
and then provide evidence of the repeated game model’s benefits through a case study. 
Lastly, a desired acceleration level, which is calculated to achieve the action set chosen by both 
players, should be an additional component of a vehicle acceleration model. A lane-changing model 
based on a game theoretical approach captures the decision-making process between two intelligent 
decision-makers. The model output is an action that will be conducted by two players at future time 
steps rather than a decision to start lane-changing. To depict practical lane-changing behaviors in a 
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microscopic traffic simulator, therefore, the game model should be integrated with other models, 
such as car-following, lane selection, and gap acceptance models. This study develops an A 
simulation model based on ABM, including a vehicle acceleration controller based on the game model 
and a car-following model, then conducts a simulation study to evaluate the performance of the 
repeated game model. 
3. Merging decision-making model using a repeated game concept 
As previously noted, this study aims at developing a decision-making game for merging 
maneuvers on a freeway based on the repeated game concept. The following subsections describe, in 
detail, a stage game for merging decision-making and repeated game design and the development of 
the player payoff functions. 
3.1. Stage Game Design 
The game model defines the number of players, action strategies of each player, and 
corresponding payoff functions to describe the outcome for each player throughout the game [32]. 
This study adopts the decision-making game model structure for merging maneuvers proposed by 
the authors in 2017, which consists of two players: the drivers of the SV and LV. The driver of SV, 
who wants to make a lane change, has three action strategies (see Figure 1(a)): (1) change lane (𝑠𝑠1), 
(2) wait for the LV’s overtaking maneuver (𝑠𝑠2), or (3) overtake the LV and use a forward gap to merge 
(𝑠𝑠3). The opposite player, the driver of LV, has two action strategies (see Figure 1(b)): (1) yield to 
allow the lane change maneuver of the driver of SV (𝑙𝑙1) or (2) block the SV’s merging maneuver by 
decreasing the spacing available for the SV (𝑙𝑙2) [1]. In real life situations, the driver of LV can choose 
lane-changing to the left lane to avoid potential collision or considerable deceleration [33], and this 
lane-changing behavior was considered as an action strategy of the driver of LV in [29]. Freeway 
vehicles on the rightmost lane generally change lanes from the rightmost lane upstream of the 
merging section after perceiving the approach of the merging vehicle in order to maintain their speed. 
Since this mainline vehicle’s lane change is conducted earlier and thus does not involve interaction 
with the merging vehicle, this study does not include a lane-changing action as one of the actions of 
the driver of the LV in the proposed merging game. 
 
(a)  
 
(b)   
Figure 1. Players’ strategies for merging maneuver: (a) the driver of SV; (b) the driver of LV ([1]). 
Let 𝑆𝑆 = {𝑠𝑠1, 𝑠𝑠2, 𝑠𝑠3} and 𝐿𝐿 = {𝑙𝑙1, 𝑙𝑙2} denote the set of pure strategies for the drivers of the SV and 
LV, respectively. In addition, 𝑎𝑎 = �𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 , 𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗� denotes a set of actions (𝑎𝑎 ∈ 𝑆𝑆 × 𝐿𝐿) where 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗 indicate 
the index of action strategies of the drivers of the SV and LV (i.e., 𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2, 3 and 𝑗𝑗 = 1, 2). As such, a 
total of six sets of action strategies were defined for the non-cooperative decision-making stage game. 
In these action strategies, (𝑠𝑠1, 𝑙𝑙1), (𝑠𝑠2, 𝑙𝑙2), and (𝑠𝑠3, 𝑙𝑙1) are cooperative action strategies, whereas both 
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(𝑠𝑠1, 𝑙𝑙2) and (𝑠𝑠2, 𝑙𝑙1) are non-cooperative strategies in which both players’ compete to achieve their 
objectives. The action strategy (𝑠𝑠3, 𝑙𝑙2) is neither cooperative nor competitive. The proposed stage 
game with imperfect information, which captures the fact that players are simply unaware of the 
actions chosen by other players, is represented in Figure 2. In the figure, a dashed line uniting three 
nodes, which implies imperfect information, indicates that the players do not know which node they 
are in. This means that there is no sequence in making a decision, and thus the driver of LV does not 
know the SV’s movement. Moreover, 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  and 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 denote the payoff for the drivers of the SV and LV 
for each action strategy 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 , respectively. 
 
Figure 2. Merging decision-making game in the extensive form. 
The drivers initially play the stage game to decide on an individual action at the moment when 
a SV, a LV, and a preceding (lead) vehicle (PV) are identified ([1]). It was assumed that the initial 
game is played when the driver of the SV reaches the start of an acceleration lane. Additional stage 
games are formed by overtaking the PV or waiting to be overtaken by the LV. In other words, the 
stage game is re-built when a change of surrounding vehicles occurs, i.e., PV or LV, in the target lane.  
3.2. Repeated Game Design 
In the game model, one of the characteristics to be specified is the number of games to be 
repeated [25]. Aside from [2], to the author’s knowledge none of the other game theory-based models 
used the repeated game approach. In the authors’ previous study, a repeated game approach was 
used in order to depict a practical decision-making process for merging maneuvers. In real life, at a 
freeway merging section in a traditional transportation environment, a driver continuously makes a 
decision using the data taken in by sight and controls the vehicle to fulfill their decision. When the 
merging vehicle enters the acceleration lane, the driver of the SV selects a gap type to change a lane 
and then directs their vehicle accordingly. The driver controls the acceleration level to synchronize 
the vehicle speed with the freeway vehicles and ensure a safe gap distance [27,33]. During this lane-
changing preparation process, the driver of SV repeatedly checks surroundings to judge if their 
decision can be fulfilled and tries to follow-up on their decision. In this study, therefore, this 
repetition in decision-making for merging maneuvers prior to lane-changing execution was regarded 
as playing the game repeatedly.  
The repeated game concept implies that a stage game with identical structure is repeatedly 
played until termination of the game, which is divided into two classes: finite or infinite, depending 
on the players’ beliefs about the number of repetitions. In this study, the decision-making game for 
merging was regarded as an infinitely repeated game because the players in the game do not know 
how many times the game will be repeated. Note that for an infinitely repeated game, the stage game 
will not necessarily be repeated an infinite number of times.  
Drivers (i.e., players) interact by playing a stage game numerous times. As a summary of 
explanation about the game model type, the one-shot game model implies that previous game results 
do not affect the present game, while the decision-makers take previous game results into account in 
the repeated game model, as illustrated in Figure 3. This study adopts the repeated decision-making 
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game approach using the cumulative payoffs to prevent repeated fluctuations in payoffs, as proposed 
in [2]. The stage decision-making game is conducted periodically and repeatedly over discrete time 
periods 𝑇𝑇 ∈ [𝑡𝑡1, 𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛]. Time preference is considered by assuming that future payoffs are weighted 
proportionately at a rate 𝛿𝛿 , called the rate factor. Cumulative payoffs of the driver 𝑑𝑑 for action 
strategy 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 , i.e., 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑 = 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  or 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, are presented in Equation (1). 
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝑑𝑑(𝑇𝑇) =  �𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡−1𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑 (𝑡𝑡)𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛
𝑡𝑡1
. (1) 
Here 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑 (𝑡𝑡) is a utility of a driver 𝑑𝑑 for an action strategy set (𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 , 𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗) at time step 𝑡𝑡; 𝑇𝑇 is the number 
of decision-making time steps; and 𝑑𝑑 denotes a driver, i.e., player in a game, the driver of SV or DL. 
If 𝛿𝛿 > 1, it implies that the current payoffs are more important than the past payoffs. Otherwise, the 
previous game results could significantly affect the decision-making in a future game. 
 
Figure 3. Decision-making game based on the repeated game approach in extensive form. 
3.3. Reformulated payoff functions 
In previous game theory-based-models, the payoff functions for two players were formulated 
using the significant decision factors, such as safety, spacing (or gap), relative speed, travel time, 
expected acceleration level, remaining distance to reach the end of acceleration lane, and so on [1-
2,11,25,29,31]. In [1], we initially proposed the payoffs using five decision factors: minimization of 
travel time, avoidance of collisions (i.e., safety), travel efficiency, the LV’s expected acceleration, and 
the remaining distance to execute the maneuver. In a following study [2], the payoffs of the driver of 
SV were formulated as the expected gap and remaining distance, and the expected relative speed was 
considered as the other driver’s main decision variable. Both previous studies used multiple 
dimensioned variables making the payoffs as only interpreted as qualitative outcome to represent 
the player’s preference. In addition, an error term was considered to capture unobserved variables 
assumed to be a constant, resulting in minimal consideration of a driver’s randomness. As described 
previously, therefore, this study updates the payoff functions to use efficient decision variables 
including a random error term and proposes monotone (dimensionless) functions by transformation 
of quantitative variables. This section introduces the decision variables, and then presents the 
reformulated payoff functions for each driver. 
3.3.1. Safety payoff 
Among various decision factors, safety is a key factor for human drivers’ decisions to avoid a 
potential collision or not induce a dangerous situation. Yu et al. [31] used the time headway as a 
safety payoff, as presented in Equation (2). 
ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑥𝑥𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡)− 𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡)𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡) , (2) 
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Here 𝑥𝑥𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡)  and 𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡)  are the positions of the (potential) PV and SV at instant time 𝑡𝑡 , 
respectively; and 𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡) is speed of the SV at time 𝑡𝑡. However, they did not take the speed of a PV 
into account. In [2], the expected spacing between vehicles, indicating a possibility to ensure safe 
distance with consideration of vehicles’ speed and acceleration levels, was used. Additionally, Wang 
et al. [34] used a penalty formulated using relative speed and the gap distance. Kita [25] used the TTC 
between vehicles as the main payoff, as defined in Equation (3). 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑥𝑥𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡)− 𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡)− 𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡)− 𝑣𝑣𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡)         if  𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡) > 𝑣𝑣𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡), (3) 
Here 𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 denotes the length of the PV; and 𝑣𝑣𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡) is the speed of the PV at instant time 𝑡𝑡.  
The interactive effects of relative speed and gap distance are contained in the single measure 
TTC [35]. Brackstone et al. [36] collected realistic data using an instrumented vehicle equipped with 
relative distance- and speed-measuring sensors. Observations of vehicle trajectories from five 
participants showed that TTC is a major factor in lane-changing decisions. Most collision avoidance 
systems (or pre-crash safety systems) applied in a vehicle use the instantaneous TTC to evaluate 
collision risk [37]. Moreover, Vogel [38] recommended the use of TTC for evaluation of safety because 
it indicates the actual occurrences of dangerous situations. Vogel also noted that a situation with a 
small TTC is imminently dangerous, and that a situation with a small headway and relatively large 
TTC is a potentially dangerous situation. Therefore, this study proposes the integrated safety payoff 
function 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 with consideration of not only TTC but also headway, which was formulated using the 
hyperbolic tangent function, as presented in Equations (4) and (5). 
𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧�𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡ℎ �
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡)
𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆
− 1� + 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡ℎ �ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡)
𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆
− 1��× 0.5,   if 𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡) > 𝑣𝑣𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡)
�1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡ℎ�ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡)
𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆
− 1�� × 0.5,                      𝑜𝑜.𝑤𝑤.           , (4) 
 
𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃,𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧�𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡ℎ �
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃,𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡)
𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆
− 1� + 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡ℎ �ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃,𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡)
𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆
− 1��× 0.5,   if 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡) > 𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡)
�1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡ℎ �ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃,𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡)
𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆
− 1��× 0.5,                      𝑜𝑜.𝑤𝑤.            . (5) 
Here 𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 = min � 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡) , 3�  denotes the minimum safe time headway between the 3-second rule 
recommended by the National Safety Council [39] and the time headway to reach the end of the 
acceleration lane.  
The safety payoffs of both drivers for the action strategies were formulated to satisfy 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆 ∈[−1,1], as shown in Equations (6) to (9). 
𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃
𝑆𝑆 (𝑠𝑠1) = 0.5�𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 +  𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃,𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 �, (6) 
𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃
𝑆𝑆 (𝑠𝑠2) = − 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃,𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 , (7) 
𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃
𝑆𝑆 (𝑠𝑠3) = − 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 , (8) 
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃
𝑆𝑆 (𝑙𝑙1) = 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃,𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 = −𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 (𝑙𝑙2). (9) 
For the ‘change (𝑠𝑠1)’ action of the driver of SV, 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 (𝑠𝑠1) was formulated as the average of safety 
payoffs taking both the PV and LV in the target lane into account. For the ‘wait (𝑠𝑠2)’ and ‘overtake 
(𝑠𝑠3)’ action of the driver of SV, on the other hand, the driver’s safety payoffs were formulated to 
consider only the corresponding vehicle related to each action strategy. Likewise, it was assumed 
that the driver of LV also evaluates their safety in consideration of the SV only.  
As shown in the safety payoff formulation, the safety payoffs vary by spacing between vehicles 
and each vehicle’s speed. Figure 4 shows the prospective safety payoffs of the driver of SV at various 
speeds of the three vehicles (i.e., PV, SV, and LV), with the SV in different positions between the PV 
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and LV. In this example, spacing between the PV and LV is constant at 77 m. Figure 4(a) presents the 
case in which the SV is located close to the PV. In other words, the lead gap ∆𝑥𝑥𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 is small and the 
lag gap ∆𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃,𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃 is large. If 𝑣𝑣𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 > 𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃, 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 (𝑠𝑠1) is greater than 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 (𝑠𝑠3). Otherwise, the driver of SV is 
attracted to choose the ‘overtake (𝑠𝑠3)’ action in consideration of safety. In the second case described 
in Figure 4(b), the SV is located at the middle position between the PV and LV. Therefore, the ‘change 
(𝑠𝑠1 )’ action is relatively attractive, i.e., 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 (𝑠𝑠1) > 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 (𝑠𝑠2)  and, 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 (𝑠𝑠1) > 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 (𝑠𝑠3)  even if 𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃  is 
slightly less than 𝑣𝑣𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃  and 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃 . The the ‘overtake (𝑠𝑠3 )’ action is attractive when 𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 ≫ 𝑣𝑣𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 , and 
𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃
𝑆𝑆 (𝑠𝑠2) is greater than 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 (𝑠𝑠1) when 𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 ≪ 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃. The last case, in which the SV is close to the LV, 
represents the case where the driver of SV is drawn to choosing the ‘wait (𝑠𝑠2)’ action if 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃 > 𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃. If 
𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 > 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃, the ‘change (𝑠𝑠1)’ action is more attractive. From these cases, transformed safety payoffs are 
reasonable to represent the general decision-making results of the driver of SV. 
 
Figure 4. Safety payoffs of the driver of SV for the 𝑠𝑠1, 𝑠𝑠2, and 𝑠𝑠3 action: (a) close to the PV (∆𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃,𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃 = 67 𝑚𝑚,∆𝑥𝑥𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 =  10 𝑚𝑚 ); (b) middle position between PV and LV (∆𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃,𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃 =  38 𝑚𝑚,∆𝑥𝑥𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 = 39 𝑚𝑚); (c) close to the LV (∆𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃,𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃 =  10 𝑚𝑚,∆𝑥𝑥𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 =  67 𝑚𝑚).  
Figure 5 presents the safety payoffs for the driver of LV in the three cases described above. In 
Figure 5(a), which shows that ∆𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃,𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃  is considerably large, the driver of LV desires to choose the 
‘yield (𝑙𝑙1)’ action, except in the case where 𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛 ≪ 𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛+1. These payoffs seem to be reasonable because 
the LV is far away from the SV. In the second case, the ‘yield (𝑙𝑙1)’ action is attractive as well. This case 
is similar to a real field situation, where the lane-changing action of the following vehicle in the target 
lane mostly shows cooperation in order to accept the merging vehicle’s lane change. In the third case, 
the huge deceleration is expected to provide a gap to the SV because the LV is close to the SV. 
Therefore, the safety payoffs of the driver of LV for the ‘block (𝑙𝑙2)’ action is higher than that for the 
𝑙𝑙1 action if 𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 < 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃. Otherwise, the safety payoff of the driver of LV for the ‘yield (𝑙𝑙1)’ action is 
slightly higher, except in a freeway congested traffic condition (i.e., 𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 ≫ 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃). 
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Figure 5. Safety payoffs of the driver of LV for the 𝑙𝑙1 and 𝑙𝑙2 action: (a) close to the PV (∆𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃,𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃 = 67 𝑚𝑚,∆𝑥𝑥𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 =  10 𝑚𝑚 ); (b) middle position between PV and LV (∆𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃,𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃 =  38 𝑚𝑚,∆𝑥𝑥𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 = 39 𝑚𝑚); (c) close to the LV (∆𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃,𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃 =  10 𝑚𝑚,∆𝑥𝑥𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 =  67 𝑚𝑚).  
3.3.2. Forced merging payoff for the driver of SV 
According to the empirical field data collected at a freeway merging section, the driver of a 
vehicle entering through an on-ramp usually accelerates for speed-harmonization with freeway 
vehicles. The driver of SV then selects a gap to merge onto the freeway. In congested traffic 
conditions, however, the merging vehicles travel at a higher speed than the surrounding vehicles on 
the freeway. Thus, the driver occasionally rejects the initial gap and then uses a farther forward gap 
close to the end of the acceleration lane. Wan et al. found that merging vehicles pass freeway vehicles 
and try to find an acceptable gap to merge onto the freeway after traveling longer than the normal 
merging cases in congested traffic conditions [27]. Marczak et al. [40] analyzed data collected at two 
sites to find variables related to gap acceptance, concluding that the distance to the end of the 
acceleration lane is a significant variable. Also, Hwang and Park [41] concluded that the remaining 
distance is the most important factor for determining gap acceptance; the driver will most likely 
accept a smaller gap if the remaining distance to the end of the acceleration lane is smaller. In order 
to consider the case in which a vehicle merges close to the end of the acceleration lane, the payoff 
function of the driver of SV should include a term called the forced merging payoff, which relates the 
remaining distance to the end of the acceleration lane. It affects that the driver decides the ‘change 
(𝑠𝑠1)’ action at the decision point where the remaining distance is considerably short.  
This study formulated the forced merging payoff as a function of the remaining distance and 
𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡). There is an assumption that the end of the acceleration lane is an imaginary preceding vehicle 
that is stopped. The presence of this imaginary vehicle, which is also considered as a hard wall, means 
the driver of SV cannot drive further due to the restricted length of the acceleration lane. Thus, the 
expected safety distance to maintain the instant speed of the SV, 𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡), was estimated by a car-
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following model. This study used the RPA car-following model, which was first developed by Rakha 
et al. [42]. Performance of the RPA car-following model has been validated against naturalistic 
driving data [43]. This study estimated the safety distance for the SV, 𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡) using the RPA model’s 
two components: steady-state traffic stream behavior and collision avoidance. The steady state 
modeling applies the Van Aerde’s steady state car-following model [44-45], which is a non-linear 
single regime function of vehicle speed and spacing. The first safe spacing (i.e., safety distance) 
provided by the steady-state model is 
𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶1(𝑡𝑡) =  𝑐𝑐1 + 𝑐𝑐3 ∙ 𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑐𝑐2𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓 − 𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡) . (10) 
Here 𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓 indicates the free-flow speed. The model coefficients can be computed as 
𝑐𝑐1 = 𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐2 �2𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐 − 𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓�, (11) 
𝑐𝑐2 = 𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐2 �𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓 − 𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐�2, (12) 
𝑐𝑐3 = 1𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐 − 𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐2 . (13) 
Here 𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗 , 𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐 , and 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐  indicate the jam density, speed-at-capacity, and saturation flow rate, 
respectively. The detailed definition of these coefficients is described in [44]. 
As the second component of the RPA model, collision avoidance was modeled to avoid incidents 
at non-steady state conditions [43]. The second safe spacing estimated by collision avoidance is 
defined as 
𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_2(𝑡𝑡) =  𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡)22 ∙ 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 . (14) 
Here 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛  and 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗  denote the minimum acceleration (i.e., maximum deceleration) and the jam 
spacing, respectively. 
The maximum value of two safe spacings, 𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_1(𝑡𝑡) and 𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_2(𝑡𝑡), is considered as the expected 
safe spacing to maintain current speed. 
𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡) = max �𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_1(𝑡𝑡),𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_2(𝑡𝑡),𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷 �. (15) 
 
Here 𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷  is the maximum of the remaining distance, i.e., the longitudinal length of the acceleration 
lane. 
To balance each payoff, this study re-formulated the forced merging payoff of the driver of SV, 
𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹. 
𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 = �max (𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡)− 𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷(𝑡𝑡), 0)
𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡) �2 . (16) 
Here 𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷(𝑡𝑡) indicates the remaining distance for the SV in the acceleration lane at time 𝑡𝑡. This 
formulation satisfies 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 ∈ [0,1] as shown in Figure 6. If the remaining distance is shorter than 
𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡), 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 begins to have positive payoffs, inducing a preference for the ‘change (𝑠𝑠1)’ action. This 
term presents greater payoffs when 𝑣𝑣𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡) is faster. 
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Figure 6. Forced merging payoff by the remaining distance at various speeds. 
3.3.3. Payoff functions for the drivers of the SV and LV 
Table 1 represents the updated merging decision-making model in normal form. The payoff 
functions of the driver of SV consist of both the safety and forced merging payoffs, and those of the 
driver of LV include the safety payoffs only. In order to capture unobserved utility, both players’ 
payoff functions also have an error term, which was assumed to be normally distributed as 
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃  ~ 𝑁𝑁(0, 1). The parameters in the payoff functions, i.e., set of 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  (𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,3 and 𝑗𝑗 
= 1, 2), are parameters to be estimated.  
Table 1. Game Structure and Payoff Functions of the Merging Decision-Making Game in Normal 
Form 
Player & Actions 
Driver of LV 
Yield [𝒍𝒍𝟏𝟏(𝒒𝒒𝟏𝟏)] 2 Block [𝒍𝒍𝟐𝟐(𝒒𝒒𝟐𝟐)] 
D
riv
er
 o
f S
V
 
Change 
[𝑠𝑠1(𝑝𝑝1)] 1 𝑃𝑃11 = 𝛼𝛼111 + 𝛼𝛼112 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 (𝑠𝑠1) + 𝛼𝛼113 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 + 𝜀𝜀11𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 𝑄𝑄11 = 𝛽𝛽111 + 𝛽𝛽112 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 (𝑙𝑙1) + 𝜀𝜀11𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃12 = 𝛼𝛼121 + 𝛼𝛼122 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 (𝑠𝑠1) + 𝛼𝛼123 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹 + 𝜀𝜀12𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 𝑄𝑄12 = 𝛽𝛽121 + 𝛽𝛽122 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 (𝑙𝑙2) + 𝜀𝜀12𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃 
Wait 
[𝑠𝑠2(𝑝𝑝2)] 𝑃𝑃21 = 𝛼𝛼211 + 𝛼𝛼212 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 (𝑠𝑠2) + 𝜀𝜀21𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 𝑄𝑄21 = 𝛽𝛽211 + 𝛽𝛽212 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 (𝑙𝑙1) + 𝜀𝜀21𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃22 = 𝛼𝛼221 + 𝛼𝛼222 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 (𝑠𝑠2) + 𝜀𝜀22𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 𝑄𝑄22 = 𝛽𝛽221 + 𝛽𝛽222 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 (𝑙𝑙2) + 𝜀𝜀22𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃 
Overtake 
[𝑠𝑠3(𝑝𝑝3)] 𝑃𝑃31 = 𝛼𝛼311 + 𝛼𝛼312 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 (𝑠𝑠3) + 𝜀𝜀31𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 𝑄𝑄31 = 𝛽𝛽311 + 𝛽𝛽312 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 (𝑙𝑙1) + 𝜀𝜀31𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃32 = 𝛼𝛼321 + 𝛼𝛼322 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 (𝑠𝑠3) + 𝜀𝜀32𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 𝑄𝑄32 = 𝛽𝛽321 + 𝛽𝛽322 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 (𝑙𝑙2) + 𝜀𝜀32𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃 
1 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 in parentheses denotes the probability assigned to the pure strategy of the driver of SV, 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖; ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖3𝑖𝑖=1 = 1. 
2 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗  in parentheses denotes the probability assigned to the pure strategy of the driver of LV, 𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗; ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗2𝑗𝑗=1 = 1. 
 
4. Model Calibration and Validation 
Model evaluation was conducted to prove efficiency of the game models using the stage game 
based on the newly formulated payoff functions. This section introduces the observation dataset for 
model evaluation and calibration methodology. In addition, calibration and validation results of our 
previous model and the updated repeated game models are presented.  
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4.1. Preparation of Observation Dataset  
This study used NGSIM vehicle trajectory data from a segment of U.S. Highway 101 (Hollywood 
Freeway) in Los Angeles, California, collected between 7:50 a.m. and 8:35 a.m. on June 15, 2005 [14-
15]. Reasonable classification of the action strategies chosen by the drivers of the SV and LV is a 
critical issue, as it is directly related to the results of the game model [2]. There is a limitation on the 
classification of drivers’ decisions based on trajectories and speed profile data. This study used a total 
of 1,504 observations extracted from NGSIM data in [2]. For classification of the SV’s maneuvers 
observed in the field, this study used the type of gaps that were selected at game playing moments 
among the three following gap types (as illustrated in Fig. 1(a)): (1) forward (lead) gap, (2) adjacent 
(current) gap, or (3) backward (lag) gap. In addition, the spacing between the SV and LV was used 
for classification of the LV’s maneuvers. Detailed classification methodology is described in [2]. Next, 
all data were reviewed to judge whether the classification results were reasonable to show drivers’ 
intentions. If the specific data were regarded as improper classification, these data were modified. 
Decisions made by drivers in all observations were classified using this process. 
4.2. Model Calibration 
4.2.1. Calibration approach 
In the game model, each player chooses an action to achieve the goal of the game. In game 
theory, the Nash equilibrium is a solution to find the optimal set of strategies for both drivers where 
they have no incentive to deviate from their initial strategy. If the Nash equilibrium exists, it implies 
that each player will choose the strategy that maximizes their own payoff while considering an 
opponent who also wants to maximize their payoff. The Nash equilibrium defines pure strategy as 
�
𝑃𝑃(𝑠𝑠∗,  𝑙𝑙∗) ≥ 𝑃𝑃(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 , 𝑙𝑙∗), ∀ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑆, 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,3
𝑄𝑄(𝑠𝑠∗, 𝑙𝑙∗) ≥ 𝑄𝑄�𝑠𝑠∗, 𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗�,     ∀ 𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝐿𝐿, 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2  , (17) 
where s* and l* indicate the equilibrium action strategy of the drivers of the SV and LV, respectively. 
In this study, if a pure strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist, a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium 
involves at least one player playing a randomized strategy and no player being able to increase their 
expected payoff by playing an alternate strategy. A probability for each player’s strategy is assigned 
with consideration of each player’s expected payoff from the different strategies [28]. This paper used 
the MATLAB function NPG developed by Chatterjee [46] to solve a two-player, finite, non-
cooperative game. Chatterjee’s algorithm [46] solves the game by computing the Nash equilibrium 
in mixed strategies based on the estimated parameters and expected payoffs (i.e., 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  and 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗). The 
algorithm provides the probabilities of the choice of pure action strategies for each driver (i.e., 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 and 
𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗) in each observation. 
In order to calibrate the merging decision-making model, this study followed the calibration 
method developed by Liu et al. [11], who proposed a parameter estimation method by solving a bi-
level programming problem. As illustrated in Figure 7, the lower-level programming is to find the 
Nash equilibrium using Chatterjee’s function [46]. This study also defined that the upper level is a 
non-linear programming problem to minimize the total deviation of probabilities in the system in 
order to choose actual observed actions by the following function 
min  �(1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 ∙ 𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘)𝑛𝑛
𝑘𝑘=1
, (18) 
where 𝑘𝑘  denotes the index of observations; 𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘  is the observed action strategies set (𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 , 𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘 ) in 
observation 𝑘𝑘; and 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 and 𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 are the probabilities of the drivers of the SV and LV, respectively, 
choosing the observed action in 𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘. Here, 𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘 and 𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 denote all parameters to be estimated for each 
driver’s payoff functions. 
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Figure 7. Schematic workflow for bi-level programming. 
4.2.2 Calibration results 
As mentioned earlier, this study calibrated a total of two types of game models: (1) the one-shot 
game model, in which the developed stage game is played independently at every game point based 
on instantaneous status only; (2) the repeated game model using the cumulative payoffs with factor 
𝛿𝛿  of various rates. To verify performance of the updated payoff functions in predicting human-
drivers’ decisions in merging situations, the first type of the models was subdivided into two models 
according to the payoff functions used in model calibration as below.  
• One-shot game model based on the stage game using the payoff functions developed in [2] 
• One-shot game model based on the stage game using the reformulated payoff functions in 
Section 3.3 
Herein the former and latter models were called as the ‘previous one-shot game model’ and the ‘one-
shot game model’, respectively. For model calibration, a NGSIM dataset observed between 7:50 a.m. 
and 8:20 a.m. was used. The number of observations used in model calibration was 685 (out of 1,504). 
Table 2 shows the estimated parameters of the payoff functions of the drivers of the SV and LV. 
In order to compare the models’ prediction accuracy, the mean absolute error (MAE) was 
calculated using Equation (19). 
𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 = 1
𝑁𝑁
 � |1 − 1(𝑥𝑥�𝑘𝑘 − 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘)|𝑁𝑁
𝑘𝑘=1
, (19) 
where 𝑁𝑁, 𝑥𝑥�𝑘𝑘, and 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘 denote the number of observations, model prediction, and actual observations, 
respectively. Note that 1(𝑥𝑥�𝑘𝑘 − 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘) is equal to one if 𝑥𝑥�𝑘𝑘 = 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘 , and is zero otherwise. The model 
prediction 𝑥𝑥�𝑘𝑘 was estimated by probabilities calculated using Chatterjee’s algorithm [46]. Table 3 
shows the calibration results for the MAEs of the three types of models. In comparison with our 
previous model, the one-shot game model using the updated payoff functions shows higher 
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prediction capacity in merging decision-making. In the repeated game models, the models with 𝛿𝛿 >1.0 were calibrated with lower MAEs than those with 𝛿𝛿 ≤ 1.0. 
Table 2. Estimated Parameters of the Payoff Functions for Game Models 
Payoff 
Function Parameters 
One-shot 
Game 
Model 
Repeated Game Models 
Model 1 
(𝜹𝜹=0.6) 
Model 2 
(𝜹𝜹=0.8) 
Model 3 
(𝜹𝜹=1.0) 
Model 4 
(𝜹𝜹=1.2) 
Model 5 
(𝜹𝜹=1.4) 
Model 6 
(𝜹𝜹=1.6) 
𝑃𝑃11  
𝛼𝛼11
1  9.64 5.10 2.88 6.69 -1.77 7.08 7.11 
𝛼𝛼11
2  23.51 74.83 48.38 96.45 9.20 27.34 8.38 
𝛼𝛼11
3  32.69 59.51 69.45 1.00 5.16 97.08 2.75 
𝑃𝑃12  
𝛼𝛼12
1  9.43 8.83 3.58 7.87 8.64 7.27 -6.26 
𝛼𝛼12
2  87.57 77.60 44.40 86.30 3.11 50.13 4.25 
𝛼𝛼12
3  10.98 43.84 1.80 71.19 5.73 84.75 7.34 
𝑃𝑃21  
𝛼𝛼21
1  0.63 -9.78 -7.49 -6.91 -8.88 -6.65 -8.13 
𝛼𝛼21
2  3.35 26.60 10.68 62.49 3.18 31.94 1.75 
𝑃𝑃22  
𝛼𝛼22
1  -7.88 -8.50 -3.42 -6.19 9.73 -8.98 5.56 
𝛼𝛼22
2  42.64 20.75 5.21 65.72 6.22 19.43 7.16 
𝑃𝑃31  
𝛼𝛼31
1  -0.66 6.07 -9.38 -6.21 -2.84 -5.18 6.41 
𝛼𝛼31
2  67.24 48.05 78.92 94.59 11.19 25.08 7.53 
𝑃𝑃32  
𝛼𝛼32
1  -0.53 -3.10 -5.39 -0.44 2.75 -3.69 8.35 
𝛼𝛼32
2  16.91 52.79 95.22 59.86 2.21 30.06 4.79 
𝑄𝑄11 
𝛽𝛽11
1  9.93 3.78 6.96 9.80 -1.99 7.97 -3.75 
𝛽𝛽11
2  13.30 17.29 6.64 25.06 6.88 5.86 10.22 
𝑄𝑄12 
𝛽𝛽12
1  -1.26 -8.39 -6.24 -5.83 -7.03 -8.90 -8.36 
𝛽𝛽12
2  3.70 0.29 19.40 23.84 10.20 18.49 1.89 
𝑄𝑄21 
𝛽𝛽21
1  5.78 7.64 8.05 8.74 5.52 8.25 0.27 
𝛽𝛽21
2  89.18 57.76 58.65 78.06 2.76 82.45 4.12 
𝑄𝑄22 
𝛽𝛽22
1  7.73 -4.36 -4.36 0.63 0.34 -8.66 -5.95 
𝛽𝛽22
2  57.97 6.64 55.26 14.12 7.43 38.74 7.61 
𝑄𝑄31 
𝛽𝛽31
1  3.88 -4.02 -6.99 6.38 9.39 -0.82 3.68 
𝛽𝛽31
2  55.87 96.95 98.01 1.12 4.35 46.49 9.22 
𝑄𝑄32 
𝛽𝛽32
1  4.26 -9.75 1.08 -8.01 6.78 1.53 -4.85 
𝛽𝛽32
2  27.87 26.74 22.93 74.89 2.20 86.19 7.83 
Note that the previous one-shot game model using the payoff functions in [2] was calibrated using the same 
calibration methodology, but the estimated parameters are not shown in the table because of the different 
formulation for payoff functions. 
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Table 3. Calibration Results 
Models 
Previous 
One-shot 
Game Model 
(2018)  
One-shot 
Game 
Model 
Repeated Game Models 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Rate 
factor, 𝛿𝛿 
na 1 na 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 
MAE 2 0.2555 (74.45 %) 
0.1241 
(87.59 %) 
0.1708 
(82.92 %) 
0.1606 
(83.94 %) 
0.1606 
(83.94 %) 
0.1372 
(86.28 %) 
0.1358 
(86.42 %) 
0.1460 
(85.40 %) 
1 Not applicable. 
2 The number in parentheses indicates prediction accuracy. 
4.3. Model Validation 
The rest of the data, 819 observations out of 1,504, collected between 8:20 a.m. and 8:35 a.m., 
were used for validating the model, and the validation results are shown in Table 4. Model validation 
results, which show the same trends as the calibration results, are summarized as follows. First, when 
comparing the results of the stage game developed in the previous study [2] and this study, the 
prediction accuracy increase by about 12% when the third stage game is used. Thus, this study 
enhances the decision-making game model’s performance by using the reformulated payoff 
functions to represent merging maneuvers. Next, in the validation results, the repeated game models 
with 𝛿𝛿 ≥ 1.0 show prediction accuracy of higher than 85%. In particular, the repeated game model 
shows the highest prediction accuracy when 𝛿𝛿 = 1.4. Both the one-shot game and repeated game 
model with 𝛿𝛿 = 1.4  show considerably high prediction accuracy of more than 86%. Due to 
limitations of unbalanced observation data [1], nevertheless, model validation using field data cannot 
provide evidence to be beneficial using the repeated game. It is also hard to show the apparent 
difference between the one-shot game and the repeated game model. In the following sections, 
therefore, the game models are additionally evaluated through sensitivity analysis and simulation 
study. 
Table 4. Validation results 
Models 
Previous 
One-shot 
Game Model 
(2018)  
One-shot 
Game 
Model 
Repeated Game Models 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Rate 
factor, 𝛿𝛿 
na na 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 
MAE 1 0.2418 (75.82 %) 
0.1197 
(88.03 %) 
0.1954 
(80.46 %) 
0.1758 
(82.42 %) 
0.1465 
(85.35 %) 
0.1368 
(86.32 %) 
0.1307 
(86.94 %) 
0.1355 
(86.45 %) 
1 The number in parentheses indicates prediction accuracy. 
5. Sensitivity Analysis of the Calibrated Stage Game 
In this section, this study describes the sensitivity analysis conducted to observe how factor 
changes related to the proposed payoffs impact the stage game results. In reality, drivers’ merging 
behavior to select an acceptable gap size and speed difference between the freeway mainline vehicles 
and the merging vehicle is different depending on the merging point [27,40]. Hence, this sensitivity 
analysis is required to demonstrate whether the developed stage game model represents merging 
behaviors observed in the field in various conditions. To show the decision-making model’s 
sensitivity, the stage game is independently played in diverse scenarios varied by three input factors: 
game location, relative speed, and spacing. Preparation for the sensitivity analysis is presented first 
in the following sections, then results and corresponding discussions are provided. 
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5.1. Sensitivity Analysis Setting 
As shown in Figure 8, a freeway segment that included an on-ramp was used for the analysis, 
with locations to play a game classified into two areas: the beginning of the acceleration lane and the 
end of the acceleration lane. For the spacing factor test, the SV changed its position between the PV 
and LV. For the speed profile test, the freeway mainline vehicles’ speed was basically categorized 
into five scenarios: 60 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚/ℎ, 70 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚/ℎ, 80 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚/ℎ, 90 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚/ℎ, and 100 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚/ℎ. In each speed scenario, 
the SV’s speed varied from 60 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚/ℎ to 100 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚/ℎ. The freeway testbed and calibrated stage game 
were modeled on MATLAB, and other simulation settings are described below. 
1. The length of the acceleration lane was 250 𝑚𝑚. 
2. Based on initial longitudinal coordination, 𝑡𝑡 − 1, 𝑡𝑡, and 𝑡𝑡 + 1 denote the PV, SV, and LV, 
respectively. 
3. It was assumed that spacing between the PV and LV, ∆𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛−1,𝑛𝑛+1, was constant as 40 𝑚𝑚: In the 
game played at the beginning of the acceleration lane, the PV and LV were located at 70 𝑚𝑚 and 
30 𝑚𝑚 from the beginning of the acceleration lane, respectively. In the game played at the end of 
the acceleration lane, the longitudinal position of the PV and LV were 230 𝑚𝑚 and 190 𝑚𝑚 from 
the beginning point, respectively.  
4. The length of all vehicles was assumed as constant at 4.8 𝑚𝑚. 
5. Link properties for the freeway are as follows. Saturation flow rate was 2,400 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣ℎ/ℎ/𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣. Jam 
density was 160 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣ℎ/𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚/𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣. Free-flow speed and speed-at-capacity were 100 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚/ℎ and 80 
𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚/ℎ, respectively. 
6. Calibrated parameters of payoff functions for the repeated game model with 𝛿𝛿 = 1.4 were used. 
 
Figure 8. Topology of freeway merging section for sensitivity analysis. 
5.2. Sensitivity Analysis Results  
Based on the results of the stage game played at two locations in various lag spacing and relative 
speed scenarios, the impact of input factors and other findings revealed by the sensitivity analysis 
are provided. Figure 9(a) to 9(e) show the results after playing games near the beginning of the 
acceleration lane, and Figure 9(f) to 9(j) reveal the game results after playing the game near the end 
of the acceleration lane. The Chatterjee function for finding the Nash equilibrium was used to decide 
these game results [46]. If the game result in each case is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, the 
corresponding action set is a dominant decision made by two drivers, i.e., the probability of one of 
six action strategies (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 × 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗) is one. Otherwise, when a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium exists, the 
game result is randomly chosen by probabilities.  
Differences in drivers’ behaviors based on the merging point are distinct in merging maneuver 
decisions. At near the beginning of the acceleration lane, a merging vehicle driver usually passes a 
lead vehicle when 𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛 > 𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛−1  and when lead spacing (∆𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛−1,𝑛𝑛 ) is quite small [27]. The higher 
psychological pressure related to merging makes drivers accept smaller gaps as they arrive nearer 
the end of the auxiliary lane compared to cases where they can take an original gap near the beginning 
of the acceleration lane [27]. In other words, field data show that the driver of SV tried a forced 
merging maneuver at close to the end of the acceleration lane [27,33]. When  𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛 < 𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛+1 and the lag 
spacing (∆𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛,𝑛𝑛+1) is quite small, the driver of SV waits until the LV passes the SV and then may merge 
using a backward gap. In Fig. 8, the calibrated stage game results show these behaviors in choosing 
an ‘overtake (𝑠𝑠3)’ and ‘wait (𝑠𝑠2)’ action according to the game location.  
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At near the beginning of the lane, as illustrated in Figure 9(a) to 9(d), the game results show that 
the driver of SV chooses the ‘overtake (𝑠𝑠3)’ action in conditions indicative of higher relative speed 
and short lead spacing. In contrast, the game results (as illustrated in Figure 9(f) to 9(i)) show that the 
driver of SV intentionally changes a lane due to a short remaining distance in the acceleration lane. 
For the ‘wait (𝑠𝑠2)’ action, differences in the results of the stage game for merging decision-making are 
revealed according to game location. These results prove that the forced merging utility works 
correctly when the SV is close to the end of the acceleration lane. Consequently, the stage game 
developed in this study accurately depicts realistic decisions made by human drivers according to 
game location. 
As discussed in Section 3.3.3, TTC is critical in making lane-changing decisions. Since TTC is 
comprised of spacing (i.e., space headway) and relative speed, both are important in human drivers' 
decision-making for merging maneuvers at freeway merging sections. Hence, this study also 
analyzed the impacts of these factors. In Figure 9(c), blue lines parallel to the y-axis (as marked with 
① to ③) and green lines parallel to the x-axis (as marked with A and B) denote test cases for 
sensitivity analysis on relative speed and spacing, respectively.  
In the sensitivity analysis on relative speed, the PV and LV are supposed to drive at 80 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚/ℎ, 
and the SV’s speed varies from 60 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚/ℎ  to 100 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚/ℎ. Scenarios were prepared with three lag 
spacings: 10 𝑚𝑚, 20 𝑚𝑚, and 30 𝑚𝑚, and the game results of all scenarios are shown in Figure 10. Game 
results clearly show that the relative speed affects decision-making. When lag spacing (∆𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛,𝑛𝑛+1) is 10 
𝑚𝑚 (as shown in Figure 10(a)), the drivers of the SV and LV decide on a ‘wait (𝑠𝑠2) and block (𝑙𝑙2)’ action 
set if ∆𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛,𝑛𝑛+1 ≤ −10 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚/ℎ. In addition, both drivers are willing to choose a ‘change (𝑠𝑠1) and yield 
(𝑙𝑙1)’ action set through the stage game if ∆𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛,𝑛𝑛+1 ≥ −7 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚/ℎ. These cooperative action strategy sets 
are results of both drivers’ common consent subject to safety. In a certain range, i.e., −10 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚/ℎ <
∆𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛,𝑛𝑛+1 < −7 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚/ℎ, drivers’ desired actions are competitive; in these conditions, the non-cooperative 
behaviors, ‘change (𝑠𝑠1) and a block (𝑙𝑙2)’ action, will be carried out.  
When ∆𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛,𝑛𝑛+1 = 20 𝑚𝑚, in Figure 10(b), the driver of the SV and LV choose a cooperative action 
strategy (𝑠𝑠1, 𝑙𝑙1) even if ∆𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛,𝑛𝑛+1 = −20 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚/ℎ. This means that the relative speed is largely irrelevant 
in influencing the driver of SV to choose a lane-changing action if there is sufficient spacing between 
vehicles. If there is enough space headway, real-life experience generally shows that a driver of a 
merging vehicle will change a lane upon reaching an acceleration lane even though a speed 
harmonization process is required. In response to the merging vehicle’s lane change, the driver of LV 
decreases speed to adjust to the new preceding vehicle (i.e., the SV) or changes a lane to the left to 
maintain its speed. When ∆𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛,𝑛𝑛+1 = 30 𝑚𝑚 (i.e., ∆𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛−1,𝑛𝑛 = 10 𝑚𝑚), moreover, the game results show 
a distinct feature depending on the relative speed. The cooperative action strategy (𝑠𝑠1, 𝑙𝑙1) is chosen 
by the stage game until 𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛  is slightly higher than 𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛−1 . If ∆𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛,𝑛𝑛−1 ≥ 8 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚/ℎ, the driver of SV 
chooses an ‘overtake (𝑠𝑠3)’ action due to a relatively small TTC in order to avoid harsh braking. Of the 
overtaking vehicles, 97.7% were found to have a speed higher than the freeway mainline vehicles 
[27]. Thus, this game model can reasonably represent decision-making results according to relative 
speed. 
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Note that a red line parallel to the x-axis on each graph indicates the speed of the freeway mainline vehicles (𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛−1, 𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛+1). 
Figure 9. Graphical representation of the one-shot game results depending on game locations, spacing 
between vehicles (∆𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛,𝑛𝑛+1), and speed of the SV (𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛).  
 
Sensors 2019, 19, x FOR PEER REVIEW 20 of 34 
 
 
Figure 10. Game results on relative speed. 
For the sensitivity analysis on spacing, the stage game was played with various lag spacing from 
0 𝑚𝑚 to 40 𝑚𝑚. The PV and LV are supposed to drive at 80 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚/ℎ, and the SV’s speed is 70 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚/ℎ and 
90 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚/ℎ. Game results of all scenarios are shown in Figure 11. In the figure, the x-axis indicates the 
lag spacing (∆𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛,𝑛𝑛+1), and hence an increase of ∆𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛,𝑛𝑛+1 means a decrease of lead spacing (∆𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛−1,𝑛𝑛).  
When 𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛 < 𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛−1, as shown in Figure 11(a), the stage game results show that the driver of SV 
decides on a ‘wait (𝑠𝑠2)’ action in cases in which lag spacing is less than 10 𝑚𝑚. In other words, results 
indicate that a slower SV requires spacing of more than 10 𝑚𝑚  to choose a ‘change (𝑠𝑠1 )’ action. 
Depending on the spacing, competitive decision-making is also expected. This trend is also found in 
choosing an ‘overtake (𝑠𝑠3 )’ action when 𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛 > 𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛−1 . In Figure 11(b), the driver of SV decides to 
overtake at ∆𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛−1,𝑛𝑛 ≤ 12 𝑚𝑚. Therefore, the sensitivity results indicate that the stage game reasonably 
explains the difference in drivers' choices according to spacing. 
 
Figure 11. Game results on spacing. 
In the results, decisions included in a non-cooperative action strategy set, i.e., (𝑠𝑠1, 𝑙𝑙2), are found 
in a specific decision-making region, as colored black in Figure 9. This region implies that this strategy 
set, which is decided simultaneously by drivers, puts them into competition. This result means that 
the driver of SV wants to change a lane after trying to ensure a safe lead and lag gap and the driver 
of LV does not allow the SV to merge. During the game period, one driver should change their initial 
decision to avoid a potential collision, and the final decision set would be a cooperative set. In 
addition, due to an unbalance in the number of observations indicating each action strategy, the 
(𝑠𝑠2 , 𝑙𝑙1) action cannot be determined in this sensitivity analysis. From field data, including NGSIM 
data, it is clear that merging maneuvers are usually cooperative, as the driver of LV perceives the 
SV's lane-changing intention. Compared to cooperative merging, non-cooperative cases are only 
occasionally observed. The stage game results describe cooperative behaviors, and competition 
between drivers can be found at certain relative speed and spacing profiles. Consequently, the stage 
game model proposed in this study successfully explains rational human drivers’ decision-making 
results. 
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6. Simulation Case Study 
In this chapter, a simulation study is presented to demonstrate the performance of the game 
model based on the developed stage game for merging. For this case study, a microscopic simulation 
model based on an ABM method that included a vehicle acceleration controller was developed. To 
verify the performance of the ABM, a comparison between NGSIM data and simulation results is 
provided. The simulation setting is defined, and then various merging scenarios representing both 
cooperative and non-cooperative cases are explained. Next, simulation results for each scenario are 
presented.   
6.1. Simulation model development 
To investigate whether the repeated game model is efficient to use in microscopic traffic 
simulation, we used an ABM approach. ABM is a powerful method for making simulations that is 
widely applied across real-life problems [47-49]. This study developed a simulation model that was 
built on MATALB using the ABM method combined with the game model. ABM is a suitable 
approach for simulating the actions and interactions of intelligent entities, which includes individual 
people. Collaboration and competition, in particular, are major concerns in game theory; these are 
two typical types of human interactions addressed in several ABM methods [50]. One of the 
applicable situations for using ABM is when interactions among agents are heterogeneous and can 
lead to network effects [48,51]. Thus, this study develops a simulation model to explain merging 
interactions. 
According to Zheng et al. [49], the ABMs explored for the existing transportation system in 
today’s literature, in general, have the distinguishing feature of integration combining three 
components: drivers’ action decisions, drivers’ route decisions, and microsimulation. As a 
microsimulation component, the simulation model developed in this study basically simulates 
vehicle movements based on position and by speed profile as determined by an acceleration 
controller at each time step. As shown in Figure 12, the controller consists of a game module and a 
car-following module. According to the game model for the drivers’ action decision component, a 
driver of SV plays a stage game with a driver of LV in the target lane. Depending on the action 
strategies at each game time, both drivers determine the acceleration level to accomplish their own 
strategy. In the car-following module, in addition, the desired acceleration level is decided by the 
RPA car-following model. In this acceleration controller, neither the individual demographic nor 
travel characteristics of either agent are considered.  
As the game results show, when the driver of SV chooses a ‘change (𝑠𝑠1)’ action, they evaluate 
lead and lag spacing for gap acceptance to satisfy sufficient spacing and collision avoidance. If the 
instantaneous gap is enough to change a lane, the SV begins merging onto the freeway, and the driver 
of LV determines the acceleration level to follow the SV in the car-following model in response to 
recognition of the SV’s lane-change. In addition, a route decision module is not required because 
merging scenarios are tested on the one-lane freeway network, which includes a merging ramp.  
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Figure 12. Vehicle acceleration controller structure in the developed simulation model. 
Car-following module estimates an desired acceleration level based on instantaneous spacing 
between vehicles and speed at each time step 𝑡𝑡. This study used two components, i.e., steady-state 
and collision avoidance, of the RPA car-following model for the module [43]. The detailed definition 
and formulas of the components in the RPA model are described in [43]. Figure 13 shows 
performance of car-following module in a case which five vehicles formed a platoon. Vehicles decide 
an acceleration level to follow preceding vehicle by the RPA car-following model. Here, it was 
assumed that vehicles were located with shorter spacing than the steady-state spacing of Van Aerde’s 
car-following model [44] at simulation time 0. As illustrated in Figure 13, therefore, following vehicles 
initially decreased speed to ensure proper spacing between vehicles. Then, they began to accelerate 
after ensuring the sufficient spacing by sequence in the platoon. In conclusion, acceleration level and 
speed were oscillated for a while, and then they were stabilized.  
 
Figure 13. Performance of the car-following module. 
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The game module begins operating as soon as the SV enters the acceleration lane. The nearest 
following vehicle in the target lane becomes the opposite player. In this module, there are two types 
of merging game: (1) the one-shot game; (2) the repeated game. In detail, the one-shot game uses 
instantaneous payoffs, which are computed based on spacing and speed profile at time 𝑡𝑡, for each 
action strategy set, i.e., 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡),𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡). In the repeated game, on the other hand, the cumulated payoffs 
are utilized. Regardless of the game type, two players decide an action strategy set subject to the Nash 
equilibrium. Based upon the action chosen at time 𝑡𝑡, the desired acceleration level for each vehicle is 
calculated to execute that vehicle’s individual action strategy. For the SV, the desired acceleration 
level is determined, as stated below. 
• For ‘change (𝑠𝑠1)’ action, the driver of SV determines acceleration level in consideration of not 
only speed synchronization but also gap acceptance. If 𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) ≪ 𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛+1(𝑡𝑡), an acceleration level for 
speed harmonization is additionally calculated. Also, by gap acceptance rule, another 
acceleration level is calculated to ensure sufficient gap for lead and lag spacing.  
• For ‘wait (𝑠𝑠2)’ action, a required acceleration level to wait in acceleration lane until the lag vehicle 
pass the SV is computed. Generally, waiting cases are observed when 𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) ≪ 𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛+1(𝑡𝑡) and 
∆𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛,𝑛𝑛+1 is not sufficient. If 𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) ≪ 𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛+1(𝑡𝑡)  and the remaining distance to the end of the 
acceleration lane at time 𝑡𝑡 , 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡), is sufficient to not require deceleration, the SV slightly 
accelerates to harmonize the speed with freeway vehicles during waiting time. 
• Lastly, it needs to calculate the required acceleration level to use the forward gap for ‘overtake 
(𝑠𝑠3)’ action. This case is observed when 𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) ≫ 𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛+1(𝑡𝑡) and ∆𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛−1,𝑛𝑛  is not sufficient. For this 
strategy, therefore, speed harmonization is exclude as an acceleration component.  
In addition, the driver of LV decides the acceleration level for a ‘yield (𝑙𝑙1)’ action by accepting 
the SV's merging intention. To provide safe spacing for merging, the LV's acceleration level was 
calculated based on the car-following model with an assumption that the SV became a potential lead 
vehicle. For a ‘block (𝑙𝑙2)’ action, on the other hand, the driver of SV shows acceleration to pass the SV 
by decreasing spacing. This decrease in spacing is regarded as blocking intention. 
6.2. Simulation Model Validation 
Prior to conducting a case study, validation of the simulation model developed in this study was 
required to determine whether the conceptual model is a reasonably accurate representation of the 
real world [52] and whether the output of simulations is consistent with real world output [53]. To 
validate the simulation model, this study used the graphical comparison technique, in which the 
graphs of values derived from the simulation model over time are compared with the graphs of 
values collected in a real system. It is a subjective, yet practical approach, and is especially useful as 
a preliminary approach [54]. Since the objective of the case study was to verify the repeated game’s 
efficiency, the simulation focuses on presenting microscopic vehicle movements based on rational 
drivers’ decision-making without consideration of individual characteristics. Considering this 
objective, a mathematical approach, such as statistical testing of simulation results, was not selected 
for model validation. Therefore, this study provides a graphical comparison between NGSIM data 
and the results derived from the simulation model to investigate similarity of trend in vehicle position 
and corresponding spacing.   
This study extracted game cases from NGSIM data in which there was no interference by other 
surrounding vehicles except for the three main vehicles (i.e., the SV, PV, and LV). Next, instantaneous 
vehicles’ location and speed at prior to 1.0 seconds in each case were prepared as input data for 
simulation. The graphical comparison results are presented showing longitudinal vehicle position 
and spacing are shown in Figure 14. In an example to show changing situation (see Figure 14(a)), 
vehicle position and corresponding lead and lag spacing are almost identical. In an example in 
overtaking situation (see Figure 14(b)), furthermore, considerable similarity is observed. The results 
show that the simulation model based on the ABM represents values similar to those found in the 
NGSIM data in longitudinal vehicle position and spacing. Consequently, it was possible to conclude 
that the developed simulation model could be utilized in the case study. 
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Figure 14. Simulation model validation results based on the graphical comparison method: (a) 
changing situation (SV ID: 268, PV ID: 258, and LV ID: 269 in the US101 data collected from 8:05 a.m. 
to 8:20 a.m.) and (b) overtaking situation (SV ID: 1108, PV ID: 1112, and LV ID: 1118 in the US101 data 
collected from 8:20 a.m. to 8:35 a.m.). 
6.3. Simulation setting and cases 
This study conducted case studies in various merging scenarios simulated for a total of five 
vehicles, including a merging vehicle. Simulation experiments were executed using both the one-shot 
game model and the repeated game model. As described above, the one-shot game herein is played 
independently without consideration of previous results at every decision-making point. The 
repeated game is played based on the cumulative payoffs proposed in Section 3.4. In addition, a 
freeway segment, including one merging section, was modeled on MATLAB, as illustrated in Figure 
15. The length of the freeway mainline was 1.0 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚 and the 250 𝑚𝑚 acceleration lane was located 80 
𝑚𝑚 downstream of the beginning of the network. The details of the simulation settings are defined as 
follows. 
1. Link properties for the freeway are as follows. Saturation flow rate was 2,400 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣ℎ/ℎ/𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣. Jam 
density was 160 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣ℎ/𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚/𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣. Free-flow speed and speed-at-capacity were 100 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚/ℎ and 80 
𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚/ℎ, respectively. 
2. Based on initial longitudinal coordination, vehicles on the network were designated as 𝑡𝑡 −2, 𝑡𝑡 − 1, 𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡 + 1, and 𝑡𝑡 + 2, respectively. Here the vehicle 𝑡𝑡 denotes the SV. 
3. It was assumed that the average initial speed of freeway vehicles was 𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓. The initial speeds of 
four vehicles on the freeway mainline (i.e., 𝑡𝑡 − 2, 𝑡𝑡 − 1,𝑡𝑡 + 1,𝑡𝑡 + 2) were randomly determined 
using the normal distribution with a mean of 𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 and standard deviation of 0.2 at simulation 
start time. 
4. The initial spacing between freeway vehicles, i.e., ∆𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛−2,𝑛𝑛−1,∆𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛−1,𝑛𝑛+1,∆𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛+1,𝑛𝑛+2 , was 
determined using the Van Aerde’s steady-state model according to instantaneous speed of 
corresponding following vehicle at time step 0.  
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5. With regard to the game, the time interval for playing the game was 0.5 𝑠𝑠. The stage game would 
be newly formed if the LV or PV changed.  
6. Maximum and minimum accelerations are 3.4 𝑚𝑚/𝑠𝑠2 and -3.4 𝑚𝑚/𝑠𝑠2, respectively, as determined 
with reference to the NGSIM data. Length of all vehicles was assumed as constant as 4.8 𝑚𝑚. 
7. In this simulation model, the freeway mainline vehicles’ behaviors to avoid a potential collision 
with the merging vehicle, i.e., lane change to left or deceleration before arriving the merging 
section, were excluded. These behaviors could not be modeled for an individual vehicle's 
driving maneuvers in traffic simulator because they are a result of vehicles’ independent 
decisions rather than any interaction with the merging vehicle after recognizing the merging 
vehicle. 
 
Figure 15. Simulation network configurations. 
A total of five simulation cases were prepared, as summarized in Table 5, to represent plausible 
merging cases as defined by diverse input values of three factors: freeway mainline vehicles’ average 
speed (𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓), initial SV’s speed (𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛), and initial lag spacing (∆𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛,𝑛𝑛+1). There are two main categories 
in merging: cooperative and competitive merging. Cooperative merging cases, in which the drivers’ 
decision set would be collaborative by common consent of both drivers, indicate typical cases to select 
a gap type among three types: a forward gap, an adjacent gap, and a backward gap. In contrast, a 
competitive merging case represents an example showing a conflict in both drivers’ behavior. For 
example, the driver of SV who wants to use an adjacent gap is willing to prepare to merge onto 
freeway by turning a signal on, and then executing a lane change. In that time, the driver of LV 
decides not to allow the cut-in to avoid the expected considerable deceleration. One of the drivers 
should change their initial decision in order to avoid a potential collision. This competitive situation 
is not common, but many drivers may have had an experience of this type. Thus, we picked two cases 
in order to show not only the game model’s performance in non-cooperative cases but also differences 
between the two game models in competitive scenarios.  
Table 5. Initial Conditions of Merging Scenarios for Case Study 
Index Scenarios Gap type used for merging 𝒗𝒗𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇������ 𝒗𝒗𝒏𝒏��� ∆𝒙𝒙𝒏𝒏,𝒏𝒏+𝟏𝟏���������� 
1 
Cooperative 
Adjacent gap 90 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚/ℎ 75 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚/ℎ 20.0 𝑚𝑚 
2 Backward (lag) gap 90 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚/ℎ 65 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚/ℎ 15.0 𝑚𝑚 
3 Forward (lead) gap 50 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚/ℎ 65 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚/ℎ 15.0 𝑚𝑚 
4 
Competitive 
Adjacent gap or backward gap 
(Initial decision: non-
cooperative) 
85 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚/ℎ 72 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚/ℎ 14.0 𝑚𝑚 
5 Adjacent gap or backward gap (Initial decision: cooperative) 90 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚/ℎ 75 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚/ℎ 7.5 𝑚𝑚 
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6.4. Case study results 
Cooperative and competitive cases were tested using the developed simulation model. In order 
to validate the repeated game model’s performance, the simulation results using the repeated model 
are compared with results using the calibrated stage game model played independently, i.e., one-
shot game model at every decision-making point.  
In cooperative scenarios, a dominant action strategy is found in rational decision-making due to 
the apparent situation. The simulation model using the repeated game model shows very close 
performance with that using the one-shot game as the game results are same in each game point. 
Since there is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in the competitive cases, both drivers decide an 
action strategy depending on the probability of actions. For case study results, this study provides 
the typical outcome of each scenario if there is no distinct difference in decision-making using the 
two game models. Otherwise, especially in the competitive scenario, the decision-making output 
simulation results of each game model are individually presented.  
6.4.1. Case 1: cooperative merging scenario using an adjacent gap 
As described in the sensitivity analysis, the developed game model has the ability to represent 
drivers’ decisions in normal cooperative merging cases. According to the game results, as shown in 
Figure 17, drivers chose a ‘change (𝑠𝑠1) and yield (𝑙𝑙1)’ action set during the game period. The SV 
slightly accelerated by speed harmonization rules in preparation for merging while the LV 
decelerated in order to accept the SV’s lane change. When a lead and lag gap was acceptable, the SV 
merged onto the freeway mainline. In simulation, the driver of SV controlled the vehicle’s speed via 
the car-following rule as soon as executing the lane change and its following vehicles also showed 
oscillation in their speed profiles to ensure a safe gap.  
 
Note that a red solid line indicates simulation data of the SV (vehicle 𝑡𝑡) during game period, whereas a blue 
solid line shows the SV’s data in simulation time except game period. 
Figure 16. Graphical representation of simulation results in case 1.  
 
Figure 17. Decision-making game results in case 1. 
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6.4.2. Case 2: cooperative merging scenario using a backward gap 
Simulation results for the second case, as shown in Figure 18, indicate that the driver of SV used 
the backward gap after the initial LV to overtake the SV. In Figure 19(a), the drivers decided on a 
‘wait (𝑠𝑠2) and block (𝑙𝑙2)’ action strategy, respectively. The LV accelerated to block merging, and the 
SV also accelerated for speed synchronization even though the driver of SV decided to take a ‘wait 
(𝑠𝑠2)’ action. As soon as the initial LV overtook the SV, a new merging decision-making game was 
identified in which the vehicle 𝑡𝑡 + 2 became the new LV. The results of the second game are shown 
in Figure 19(b). The SV continuously chose a ‘change (𝑠𝑠1)‘ action until the gap acceptance rule was 
satisfied, then moved to the freeway mainline in consideration of gap size and relative speed. The 
LV, i.e., the vehicle 𝑡𝑡 + 2, in the second game decelerated in a yielding action in response to the SV’s 
intention to merge. In conclusion, the merging decision-making model was shown to depict a typical 
waiting scenario for both game models. 
 
Note that a red solid line indicates simulation data of the SV (vehicle 𝑡𝑡) during game period, whereas a blue 
solid line shows the SV’s data in simulation time except game period. 
Figure 18. Graphical representation of simulation results in case 2.  
 
 
Figure 19. Decision-making game results in case 2. 
6.4.3. Case 3: cooperative merging scenario using a forward gap 
In overtaking scenario, time-space diagram in Figure 20 shows that the SV took the forward gap 
and then merge onto the freeway. When the SV entered the acceleration lane, the SV and LV chosen 
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the ‘overtake (𝑠𝑠3 ) and yield (𝑙𝑙1 )’ action set. Although the LV decided the yielding action, it was 
observed that the LV maintained its speed during the first game period due to observing the SV’s 
passing. After overtaking the lead vehicle, the SV began to decrease the speed to harmonize with that 
of freeway vehicles. New LV, i.e., it had been the lead vehicle in the first game period, selected the 
yielding action in interaction with the SV. So it showed the deep deceleration during the second game 
period. The SV maintained on the acceleration lane, then it changed a lane as soon as the gap 
acceptance rule was satisfied. As described in simulation setting, overtaking scenario is usually 
observed in congested traffic condition. Thus this lane-changing by overtaking action caused huge 
oscillation in speed profile because generally spacing between vehicles is small under congested 
traffic condition. It is concluded that this simulation model based on the proposed game model well 
represents inducing a backward forming shockwave by merging traffic in congested condition. 
 
Note that a red solid line indicates simulation data of the SV (vehicle 𝑡𝑡) during game period, whereas a blue 
solid line shows the SV’s data in simulation time except game period. 
Figure 20. Graphical representation of simulation results in case 3.  
 
 
Figure 21. Decision-making game results in case 3. 
6.4.4. Case 4: competitive merging scenario choosing an adjacent gap or a backward gap (1) 
In the fourth competitive merging case, the initial game result of (𝑠𝑠1, 𝑙𝑙2) is observed in Figure 
23(a). As a non-cooperative action strategy set, it means that both drivers are in competition to 
achieve their own objective. At the third decision-making point, a decision they make becomes (𝑠𝑠2, 𝑙𝑙2) 
as a cooperative action strategy set. Although the driver of SV initially wanted to change a lane using 
an adjacent gap as soon as entering an acceleration lane, they change the initial decision in order to 
avoid collision after recognizing the opposite driver’s aggressive behavior. Thus the driver finally 
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uses the backward gap for merging onto the freeway. By this case, this study conclude that the 
repeated game model enables to depict practical change of drivers’ decision in competitive decision-
making even using the cumulative function. 
 
Note that a red solid line indicates simulation data of the SV (vehicle 𝑡𝑡) during game period, whereas a blue 
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Figure 22. Graphical representation of simulation results in case 4.  
 
 
Figure 23. Decision-making game results in case 4. 
6.4.5. Case 5: competitive merging scenario choosing an adjacent gap or a backward gap (2) 
In Case 5, the simulation results show the SV used the backward gap for merging onto the 
freeway whichever game model is used, as illustrated in Figure 24 and Figure 25. This example shows 
competition to choose an adjacent gap or a backward gap, as in Case 4. However, there is a difference 
in that the initial decision is a cooperative action strategy in Case 5.  
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Figure 24. Graphical representation of simulation results in case 5 using the repeated game model.  
 
Note that a red solid line indicates simulation data of the SV (vehicle 𝑡𝑡) during game period, whereas a blue 
solid line shows the SV’s data in simulation time except game period. 
Figure 25. Graphical representation of simulation results in case 5 using the one-shot game model.  
In Figure 26(a), when the repeated game model was used, the driver of SV chose a ‘wait (𝑠𝑠2)’ 
action during the first game period and then decided to change a lane in the second game period. 
While decision-making results were maintained using the repeated game model, oscillation in 
decision-making is revealed when the one-shot game is used, as shown in Figure 27(a). One reason 
why the one-shot game model causes unstable decision results is that the stage game decides a 
driver’s action in a merging situation based on instantaneous vehicle location, speed, and acceleration 
data without consideration of previous game results (i.e., decisions made at previous game points). 
Considering the goal of each action, a change from a non-cooperative strategy set to a cooperative 
strategy is required in order to avoid a collision (if (𝑠𝑠1, 𝑙𝑙2) is chosen) or unnecessary deceleration (if 
(𝑠𝑠2, 𝑙𝑙1) is selected). However, changes between cooperative action strategy sets (i.e., (𝑠𝑠1, 𝑙𝑙1) and (𝑠𝑠2, 𝑙𝑙2)) 
are not realistic except when there is a surrounding vehicle intervention. This case shows a distinct 
difference observed in simulation results depending on which type of the two game models is used. 
Oscillation in decision-making may reduce the performance of microscopic traffic simulation models 
even though it is only observed in specific competitive merging situations.  
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Figure 26. Decision-making game results in case 5 using the repeated game model. 
 
 
Figure 27. Decision-making game results in case 5 using the one-shot game model. 
7. Conclusions 
Drivers’ behavior has a big impact on the safety and throughput of the transportation system. 
This is especially true for traffic conflicts between merging and through vehicles, in that merging 
vehicles induce shockwaves, which results in a reduction in the roadway capacity resulting in traffic 
congestion. Consequently, modeling driving behavior thoroughly and accurately is critical to 
analyzing traffic flow in microscopic traffic simulation and to taking advantage of the advanced 
vehicle driving technologies and strategies in AVs. The purpose of this study is to update the repeated 
game lane-changing model proposed in [2]. This game model has a feature that interprets interaction 
between drivers, as compared to most lane-changing models, which are focused on the lane-changing 
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vehicle only. In this study, the payoff functions were newly formulated focusing on not only 
improvements in prediction performance but also use in microscopic traffic simulators. In the model 
evaluation, the developed model captured drivers’ merging behaviors with a prediction accuracy of 
about 86%, showing improvement of about 12% compared to [2]. Also, this study presented the 
sensitivity analysis to indicate that the developed model can depict rational merging decision-making 
according to variations of the related factors: game location, relative speed, and gap size. In order to 
demonstrate why the repeated game is required in microscopic traffic simulation, moreover, a case 
study was conducted using the ABM developed to simulate merging situations. Using the repeated 
game model showed that it had superior performance to a one-shot game model, in which the stage 
game is independently played, in terms of representing practical merging behaviors in cooperative 
and competitive merging scenarios.  
In order to elaborate on this study as a state-of-the-art lane-changing model, the decision-making 
model based on the game theoretical approach needs to be expanded as a decision-making model for 
both mandatory and discretionary lane changing. Since lane-changing-related decision making can 
be affected by several factors (e.g., road design, traffic stream condition, driving skill, driver’s 
aggressiveness, etc.), the model should be calibrated based on field data collected in various 
conditions. Lastly, the game model can be applied to advanced vehicle systems, such as AVs, which 
coexist with human-operated vehicles on the roadway. The model based on the game theoretical 
approach is anticipated to become an appropriate model to decide lane-changing maneuvers and 
predict surrounding vehicle drivers’ behaviors.  
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